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Oct 2025
1) WR→NR interface blinked briefly; NR import needs did not
8A total of 4 blocks (1.00% of day) saw WR→NR ATC breaches on 2025-09-30, yet “Import of NR” showed violations in 9 blocks (2.25%).
Inference — Local import pressure into NR was broader than any single corridor pinch, pointing to systemic tightness rather than a one-off interface. Chain: WR→NR (4 blocks) + “Import of NR” (9 blocks) from the same SRI sheet.
Why it matters — Price separation risk was driven by NR’s import need; hedging NR import exposure would have been more protective than a pure WR→NR hedge.
2) Frequency tails were heavy despite a benign mean
8On 2025-09-30, average frequency printed 50.011 Hz, but 210 excursions were above 50.03 Hz and 115 below 49.97 Hz; the intraday low was 49.604 Hz at 08:22:10 IST.
Inference — Control held the mean but not the tails, implying governor/AGC headroom was tested around the morning ramp and pre-noon shoulder.
Why it matters — DSM exposure sits in the tails; timing reserves to excursion clusters (not the average) avoids paying for “quiet” hours.
3) DAM crash on 2025-09-28 was about order book, not constraints
8Weighted MCP fell to Rs 2.21/kWh as sell bids (575,933.48 MWh) dwarfed purchase bids (162,703.99 MWh) — a ~3.54× sell/buy skew.
Inference — With that skew and no same-day ATC narrative in the exchange sheet, the fall aligns with an order-book inversion, not transmission binds.
Why it matters — On such days, pre-hedging peaks is counter-productive; better to scale bids with the sell/buy ratio.
4) RTM’s tightest price wasn’t the weekend
8RTM MCP peaked at Rs 3.78/kWh on 2025-09-25 with the week’s highest scheduled volume (151,602.28 MWh), while 2025-09-28 cleared more volume (177,224.49 MWh) at only Rs 2.35/kWh.
Inference — Scarcity concentrated on a weekday ramp; weekend oversupply expanded depth and compressed price.
Why it matters — Intraday cover is most valuable on weekday shoulders; weekend “high tape” is often noise without depth.
5) Hydro-peaking auctions didn’t transact despite supply
8Across 23–30 Sep, HPDAM recorded large sell bids daily (e.g., 90–109 GWh), yet scheduled 0 MWh on every day; even on 26–28 Sep when there were purchase bids, results were zero.
Inference — Auction constraints (price/volume match windows) or offer granularity blocked monetisation of available flexibility.
Why it matters — Unused hydro flex pushes buyers into pricier RTM cover and leaves Rs on the table for hydro owners.
6) Northern thermal under-delivered; hydro stayed on-plan
8On 2025-09-29 (CEA DGR), Northern thermal generated 834.99 MU vs a program of 914.62 MU (-79.63 MU), while Northern hydro was essentially on program (327.56 MU vs 327.77 MU).
Inference — Hydro adherence backfilled part of the thermal shortfall and likely moderated import needs into NR the next day. Chain: DGR (29-Sep) → SRI (30-Sep import breaches).
Why it matters — Each ~80 MU thermal gap raises reliance on inter-regional flows or RTM, with spillover to ATC/price risk.
7) Coal inventory bloat at low-util plants skews risk
8Panipat TPS (Haryana) held 428 kt coal (199% of normative) at just 51% PLF on 2025-09-29.
Inference — Stockpiles are being parked at moderate-utilisation stations; this cushions local risk but does little for system-wide flexibility if those units aren’t scheduled.
Why it matters — Carrying costs rise while flexibility stays stranded; dispatch policy should prioritise inventory at plants likely to run.
8) PSP daily shows frequency discipline issues alongside clean “zero-shortage” optics
8All-India FVI was 0.048 on 2025-09-30, with 73.37% of time in 49.9–50.05 Hz but 22.84% above 50.05 Hz; state table simultaneously reports zero energy shortage in several NR states despite large OD/UD spikes.
Inference — Operational stress is visible in frequency metrics even when headline “shortage” reads as zero; deviation control, not scarcity, drove system risk.
Why it matters — Utilities that target “zero shortage” optics but ignore tail control invite DSM/ancillary costs in crores.
Click on Details for more Details
8A total of 4 blocks (1.00% of day) saw WR→NR ATC breaches on 2025-09-30, yet “Import of NR” showed violations in 9 blocks (2.25%).
Inference — Local import pressure into NR was broader than any single corridor pinch, pointing to systemic tightness rather than a one-off interface. Chain: WR→NR (4 blocks) + “Import of NR” (9 blocks) from the same SRI sheet.
Why it matters — Price separation risk was driven by NR’s import need; hedging NR import exposure would have been more protective than a pure WR→NR hedge.
2) Frequency tails were heavy despite a benign mean
8On 2025-09-30, average frequency printed 50.011 Hz, but 210 excursions were above 50.03 Hz and 115 below 49.97 Hz; the intraday low was 49.604 Hz at 08:22:10 IST.
Inference — Control held the mean but not the tails, implying governor/AGC headroom was tested around the morning ramp and pre-noon shoulder.
Why it matters — DSM exposure sits in the tails; timing reserves to excursion clusters (not the average) avoids paying for “quiet” hours.
3) DAM crash on 2025-09-28 was about order book, not constraints
8Weighted MCP fell to Rs 2.21/kWh as sell bids (575,933.48 MWh) dwarfed purchase bids (162,703.99 MWh) — a ~3.54× sell/buy skew.
Inference — With that skew and no same-day ATC narrative in the exchange sheet, the fall aligns with an order-book inversion, not transmission binds.
Why it matters — On such days, pre-hedging peaks is counter-productive; better to scale bids with the sell/buy ratio.
4) RTM’s tightest price wasn’t the weekend
8RTM MCP peaked at Rs 3.78/kWh on 2025-09-25 with the week’s highest scheduled volume (151,602.28 MWh), while 2025-09-28 cleared more volume (177,224.49 MWh) at only Rs 2.35/kWh.
Inference — Scarcity concentrated on a weekday ramp; weekend oversupply expanded depth and compressed price.
Why it matters — Intraday cover is most valuable on weekday shoulders; weekend “high tape” is often noise without depth.
5) Hydro-peaking auctions didn’t transact despite supply
8Across 23–30 Sep, HPDAM recorded large sell bids daily (e.g., 90–109 GWh), yet scheduled 0 MWh on every day; even on 26–28 Sep when there were purchase bids, results were zero.
Inference — Auction constraints (price/volume match windows) or offer granularity blocked monetisation of available flexibility.
Why it matters — Unused hydro flex pushes buyers into pricier RTM cover and leaves Rs on the table for hydro owners.
6) Northern thermal under-delivered; hydro stayed on-plan
8On 2025-09-29 (CEA DGR), Northern thermal generated 834.99 MU vs a program of 914.62 MU (-79.63 MU), while Northern hydro was essentially on program (327.56 MU vs 327.77 MU).
Inference — Hydro adherence backfilled part of the thermal shortfall and likely moderated import needs into NR the next day. Chain: DGR (29-Sep) → SRI (30-Sep import breaches).
Why it matters — Each ~80 MU thermal gap raises reliance on inter-regional flows or RTM, with spillover to ATC/price risk.
7) Coal inventory bloat at low-util plants skews risk
8Panipat TPS (Haryana) held 428 kt coal (199% of normative) at just 51% PLF on 2025-09-29.
Inference — Stockpiles are being parked at moderate-utilisation stations; this cushions local risk but does little for system-wide flexibility if those units aren’t scheduled.
Why it matters — Carrying costs rise while flexibility stays stranded; dispatch policy should prioritise inventory at plants likely to run.
8) PSP daily shows frequency discipline issues alongside clean “zero-shortage” optics
8All-India FVI was 0.048 on 2025-09-30, with 73.37% of time in 49.9–50.05 Hz but 22.84% above 50.05 Hz; state table simultaneously reports zero energy shortage in several NR states despite large OD/UD spikes.
Inference — Operational stress is visible in frequency metrics even when headline “shortage” reads as zero; deviation control, not scarcity, drove system risk.
Why it matters — Utilities that target “zero shortage” optics but ignore tail control invite DSM/ancillary costs in crores.
Click on Details for more Details
Powergrid’s AIS extension tender: Startup relaxation allows 80% compliance with financial norms
8Startups and MSEs can qualify if meeting 80% of turnover and liquidity bars. Net worth must still be positive across three years. The concession is unlikely to benefit many but signals policy alignment. Details
8Startups and MSEs can qualify if meeting 80% of turnover and liquidity bars. Net worth must still be positive across three years. The concession is unlikely to benefit many but signals policy alignment. Details
Ukai TPS: Consortium requests for TG foundation works rejected outright
8Bidders proposed joint execution models to meet TG deck experience norms. BHEL refused stating tender conditions prevail. This narrows the eligible bidder pool further. Details
8Bidders proposed joint execution models to meet TG deck experience norms. BHEL refused stating tender conditions prevail. This narrows the eligible bidder pool further. Details
